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Abstract: The South-to-North Water Diversion (SNWD) Project is a significant engineering 
project meant to solve water shortage problems in North China. Faced with market operations 
management of the water diversion system, this study defined the supply chain system for the 
SNWD Project, considering the actual project conditions, built a decentralized decision model and 
a centralized decision model with strategic customer behavior (SCB) using a floating pricing 
mechanism (FPM), and constructed a coordination mechanism via a revenue-sharing contract. The 
results suggest the following: (1) owing to water shortage supplements and the excess water sale 
policy provided by the FPM, the optimal ordering quantity of water resources is less than that 
without the FPM, and the optimal profits of the whole supply chain, supplier, and external 
distributor are higher than they would be without the FPM; (2) wholesale pricing and 
supplementary wholesale pricing with SCB are higher than those without SCB, and the optimal 
profits of the whole supply chain, supplier, and external distributor are higher than they would be 
without SCB; and (3) considering SCB and introducing the FPM help increase the optimal profits 
of the whole supply chain, supplier, and external distributor, and improve the efficiency of water 
resources usage. 
Key words: South-to-North Water Diversion; supply chain; strategic customer behavior; floating 
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1 Introduction 
The South-to-North Water Diversion (SNWD) Project is a significant initiative meant to 
help solve the water shortage problems in North China, and a global-scale strategic water 
resources engineering project related to the sustainable development of China’s economy. The 
project is divided into the Eastern Route Project, Western Route Project, and Middle Route 
Project, transferring water resources from the Yangtze River, and linking the Yangtze River, 
Huaihe River, Yellow River, and Haihe River to form huge water systems.  
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Currently, the Eastern Route Project is due for completion and is going to be put into 
operation. However, the optimal operation theory and relevant practice of water diversion 
projects are still not sufficient. Many scholars have tried to apply the supply chain idea to 
optimal allocation and scheduling of inter-basin or transboundary water resources, have 
developed the concept and models of the water resources supply chain, and have also done 
some initial research on corresponding issues. Since water resources allocation and scheduling 
is characterized by planning and collaboration, and supply chain management is characterized 
by overall coordination and maximized benefits, Wang et al. (2004) and Wang and Hu (2005) 
thought that it was feasible and suitable to apply supply chain management to operations of 
the SNWD Project. A lot of research on supply chain management applied to optimal 
allocation and scheduling of inter-basin water resources in the SNWD Project has been done; 
concepts and basic models of the water resources supply chain have been developed; logistics 
flow, information flow, and cash flow in the water resources supply chain have been defined; 
and inventory management, logistics management, the bullwhip effect and risk management, 
and coordination of the water resources supply chain have been studied. Wang et al. (2008) 
built a principal-agent contract model and pricing model for the SNWD supply chain; Zhu et 
al. (2005, 2006), Zhu and Wang (2005), and Zhu (2007, 2008a, 2008b) designed the water 
resources supply chain structure for the Eastern Route of the SNWD Project, analyzed the 
bullwhip effect, and built a water resources allocation model and inventory management 
model; Zhang et al. (2004, 2005) built a multi-stage coordination model for the SNWD supply 
chain; Hou et al. (2008a, 2008b, 2009) built minimum commitment and flexibility contracts, a 
vendor-managed inventory (VMI) coordination model, and a stock replenishment and 
shipment scheduling (SRSS) model for the SNWD supply chain; Zhang et al. (2008) built a 
pricing model for the SNWD supply chain; and Chen et al. (2010) and Chen and Wang (2010) 
studied the relationship between social responsibility and economic benefit in SNWD Project 
operations management, researched the optimal problem of the SNWD supply chain under 
quasi-market conditions, and built the newsvendor optimization model of the SNWD supply 
chain with random rainfall under unrelated demand-rainfall conditions and related 
demand-rainfall conditions.  
In operations management of the SNWD supply chain, end-customers may choose to 
order water resources immediately or delay ordering water resources when the sale season is 
coming. This decision depends on the customers’ expectation of the future price and utility and 
the profit maximization. These kinds of customers are usually called strategic customers or 
forward-looking consumers. In the past, there has been some research on the forward-looking 
behavior of consumers. Jacobson and Obermiller (1990), Krishna et al. (1991), Krishna (1994), 
and Ho et al. (1998) studied the formation of expected future prices, the impact of dealing 
patterns on purchase behavior, and consumer perceptions of promotion activity. Recently, a lot 
of studies have combined strategic consumers with supply chain pricing and inventory 
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management to consider their mutual impact on optimal pricing, ordering, and performance. 
Aviv and Pazgal (2008) studied the optimal pricing of seasonal products in the presence of 
forward-looking consumers; Elmaghraby et al. (2008) designed optimal pre-announced 
markdowns in the presence of rational customers; Yin et al. (2009) studied inventory 
management and optimal markdown pricing policy in the presence of strategic customers; Liu 
and van Ryzin (2008) studied the impact of strategic capacity rationing on early purchases; Su 
(2007, 2010a, 2010b) and Su and Zhang (2008, 2009) researched inter-temporal pricing with 
strategic consumer behavior, the consumer stockpiling, the impact of commitment on supply 
chain performance with strategic consumer behavior, and the optimal pricing in the presence 
of speculators and strategic consumers; and Cachon and Swinney (2009, 2011) researched the 
relationship between rapid production, enhanced design, and strategic consumer behavior. 
Most of the available research focused on the impact of strategic customer behavior (SCB) on 
pricing and inventory management of industrial product supply chains. However, the impact 
of SCB on pricing and inventory management of water resources product supply chains is 
still insufficient.  
Traditional water resources allocation put one-sided emphasis on collective rationality 
and social benefit maximization from the perspectives of technique optimization, ignoring the 
impacts of individual rationality and customer behavior. The water resources management in 
the new period is characterized by communication and coordination, emphasizes the 
coordinated optimization between individual rationality and collective rationality, and takes 
the customer behavior into account, which is worth studying and practicing. 
Usually, demand is random and supply is certain in common product supply chains. In 
contrast, water supply is random and water demand is relatively certain in the Eastern Route of 
the South-North Water Diversion (ERSNWD) Project supply chains. Due to the stochastic 
characteristic of precipitation, there is some uncertainty of the water storage and inflow; this 
kind of uncertainty causes the randomness of the water supply, which is different from that of 
common product supply chains. Sometimes, precipitation which is much more than that in a 
normal year makes the water supply larger than the end-user’s demand. In this situation, to sell 
the excess water at a salvage price benefits the distributor and the whole supply chain. In 
contrast, when precipitation is much less than that in a normal year, water supply is less than 
demand. In this situation, to delay ordering with a punishment fee and to sell the water later at 
a higher price with a second ordering opportunity also benefits the distributor and the whole 
supply chain. This kind of pricing mechanism is called a floating pricing mechanism (FPM). It 
helps in the implementation of water resources savings and the improvement of water 
resources efficiency. Under the FPM, the impact of customer behavior becomes more 
important. In the SNWD water resources supply-demand system, there are four kinds of 
customers: industrial customers, residential customers, agricultural customers, and ecological 
customers, and the main customers are the industrial customers and residential customers. 
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Owing to the existence of some water storage for these customers, they are able to order water 
resources immediately at full price or wait to order water resources at a discount price to 
maximize expected utilization, according to their beliefs about their opportunity to obtain 
water resources at a salvage price and the corresponding rational expectations equilibrium. 
Hence, this kind of customer is a strategic customer. Therefore, it is necessary to study optimal 
operations of this special kind of supply-demand system with the FPM and SCB. This paper 
introduces the FPM and SCB into the SNWD supply chain decision, builds a centralized 
optimization model and a decentralized optimization model respectively for three cases, and 
constructs corresponding coordination mechanisms. Finally, this paper presents some 
numerical analysis.  
2 Definition and assumptions of SNWD supply chain  
The ERSNWD Project is a large complex inter-basin system with multiple sources, 
multiple objectives, and multiple projects for pumping, storage and water supply to achieve 
rational water distribution in North China. It is being constructed and extended with a total 
investment of 6.5×1010 yuan based on the project of water transfer from the Yangtze River to 
the North Plain of Jiangsu Province. The ERSNWD Project transfers water from the Yangtze 
River to supplement water resources for Tianjin, in the eastern part of the North China Plain, 
and the Shandong Peninsula, where it is combined with the Yellow River Diversion Project 
and the Middle Route of the SNWD Project to solve the water shortage problems in more than 
25 cities. Through structural analysis of the ERSNWD system, we can generalize the 
ERSNWD as a water resources supply chain system composed of the local sub-system and the 
external sub-system. The local sub-system mainly includes Hongzehu Lake, Luomahu Lake, 
Nansihu Lake, pumping stations, sluice gate stations, and regulation-storage reservoirs, and 
the main operations agent is the Jiangsu Shuiyuan Corporation. The external sub-system 
mainly includes Dongpinghu Lake, Qianqinwa Lake, Dalangdian Lake, Beidagang Lake, 
pumping stations, sluice gate stations, and regulation-storage reservoirs, and the main 
operations agent is the Shandong Ganxian Corporation. In our research, we considered the 
Jiangsu Shuiyuan Corporation as the local supplier (S), and the Shandong Ganxian 
Corporation as an external distributor (ED). The lead time of water diversions and extreme 
flood or drought disasters are not considered in this paper. We combine the water conveyance 
loss, evaporation, and runoff with the initial water storage as the original water resources 
supply sources, and the rainfall in the external sub-system is a free external water resources 
supply source while the water diversion from the Yangtze River is an expensive water 
resources supply source. We assume that the total supply of water resources is capable of 
satisfying local demand, and there is a certain quantity of water resources satisfying the 
external distributor. 
In order to model the optimal operation problem of the SNWD Project, we set variables 
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and parameters as follows: Q is the water resources ordering quantity of the external 
distributor; p is the retail price of unit water resources for the external distributor; w is the 
wholesale price of unit water resources for the local supplier; c is the average unit cost of 
water transfer for the local supplier; sc  is the average unit cost of second water transfer for 
the local supplier, satisfying the condition sc c> ; h is the unit water resources holding cost 
for the external distributor; b is the unit water resources shortage cost for the external 
distributor; ϕ  is the usage rate of precipitation for the external distributor, satisfying the 
condition 0 1ϕ≤ < ; Hu  is the unit utility of strategic customers if they choose to order water 
resources immediately; Lu  is the unit utility of strategic customers if they choose to delay 
ordering water resources, satisfying the condition H Lu u> ; r is the reservation price of unit 
water resources for strategic customers; α  is the rate of increase of the unit water resources 
retail price if the external distributor orders water resources for a second time; β  is the rate 
of decrease of the unit water resources retail price if the external distributor sells excess water 
resources, satisfying the condition 0 0.5 1α β≤ < < < ; S is the original quantity of water 
resources storage for the external distributor; D is the demand quantity of water resources for 
the external distributor; and R is the precipitation in an external market. R is a random variable, 
satisfying the condition R R R≤ ≤ , with R  and R  being the minimum and maximum 
precipitation in the external market over N years, respectively; the cumulative density function 
and probability density function of R are ( )F R  and ( )f R , respectively, satisfying the 
conditions ( ) 0F R ≈  and ( ) 1F R ≈ , and we define ( ) ( )1F R F R= − .  
The following conditions were applied in this study: (1) ( )1h c pβ+ > − ;            
(2) sc c pα− > ; and (3) H Lp u uβ > − .  
3 Optimization and coordination model with strategic customer  
behavior 
As shown in the discussion mentioned above, due to the uncertainty of precipitation, the 
water supply and demand do not match each other, and excess water supply or water shortage 
always exists. The newsvendor model is a kind of mathematical model used to determine 
optimal inventory levels or ordering quantity for optimal production and inventory problems 
with uncertain demand or supply. Obviously, the newsvendor model is suitable for optimal 
operations of the ERSNWD supply chain. Therefore, the basic optimization and coordination 
model with the newsvendor form was built first, and then, the optimization and coordination 
model with the FPM was built. Finally, the optimization and coordination model with the FPM 
and SCB was built. 
3.1 Case without SCB and FPM 
The centralized decision model of the SNWD supply chain based on collective rationality 
and the decentralized decision model of the SNWD supply chain based on individual 
rationality were built, and the coordination between collective rationality and individual 
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rationality was studied. 
3.1.1 Centralized decision model of SNWD supply chain  
The optimal problem for the centralized decision of the SNWD supply chain is as follows:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
1
1
max d
                    d  
D S Q
R
R
D S Q
Q p S r Q b D S r Q cQ f r r
pD h S r Q D cQ f r r
ϕ
ϕ
Π ϕ ϕ
ϕ
− −
− −
= + + − − − − − +ª º¬ ¼
− + + − −ª º¬ ¼
³
³
 (1) 
where ( )QΠ  is the expected profit function of the whole supply chain. Respectively solving 
the first-order condition and second-order derivative regarding Q of ( )QΠ , we found that 
the problem of Eq. (1) was a convex optimization problem, and we can obtain the optimal 
ordering quantity under the centralized decision satisfying the following condition: 
 ( )C1 h cF D S Q p h bϕ
ª º +
− − =« » + +¬ ¼  (2) 
where CQ  is the optimal ordering quantity under the centralized decision. Obviously, with 
the centralized decision, the optimal ordering quantity increases as the retail price p and 
shortage cost of unit water resources b increases, and decreases as the transfer cost c increases. 
As the optimal ordering quantity is obtained, the optimal profit of the supply chain under the 
centralized decision is easy to determine.  
3.1.2 Coordination for decentralized decision model of SNWD supply chain 
We assume that the external distributor shares 1 φ−  of his revenue with the local 
supplier under a revenue-sharing contract, where φ  is the proportion of retained revenue for 
the external distributor, and 0 1φ≤ ≤ . Therefore, the optimal problem for the external 
distributor under the decentralized decision is as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1
d
1
max d
  d
D S Q
R
R
D S Q
p S r Q b D S r Q wQ f r r
pD h S r Q D wQ f r r
ϕ
ϕ
Π φ ϕ ϕ
φ ϕ
− −
− −
= + + − − − − − +ª º¬ ¼
− + + − −ª º¬ ¼
³
³
 (3) 
where dΠ  is the expected profit function of external distributor under the revenue-sharing 
contract. The structure of this problem is the same as the centralized decision condition. 
Respectively solving the first-order condition and second-order derivative regarding Q of dΠ , 
we found that the problem of Eq. (3) was a convex optimization problem, and we can obtain 
the optimal ordering quantity under the decentralized decision satisfying the following condition: 
 ( )D1 h wF D S Q p h bϕ φ
ª º +
− − =« » + +¬ ¼  (4) 
where DQ  is the optimal ordering quantity under the decentralized decision. Apparently, the 
optimal ordering quantity for an external distributor increases as the retail price p and shortage 
cost of unit water resources b increases, and decreases as the wholesale price of unit water 
resources w increases. 
To achieve the coordination under a revenue-sharing contract, the equation C DQ Q=  
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needs to be satisfied. Therefore, we have a coordination condition as follows: 
 ( )C p h bw h c hp h b
φ + +
= + −
+ +
 (5) 
where Cw  is the coordinated wholesale price. Then, the corresponding optimal profit of the 
external distributor and local supplier under a revenue-sharing contract can be obtained. 
3.2 Case without SCB and with FPM 
As a result of random precipitation, there is always a water shortage or water oversupply 
in the water supply-demand process. Therefore, we introduce a kind of FPM. The mechanism 
is as follows: when a water shortage occurs, a local supplier provides second-ordering 
opportunity for an external distributor. The cost and price for the second ordering is higher 
than the usual ordering, and there is no shortage penalty; when a water oversupply occurs, the 
local supplier sells the excess water with a lower price than the usual price, achieving effective 
use of flood resources.  
3.2.1 Centralized decision model of SNWD supply chain 
The optimal problem for the centralized decision of the SNWD supply chain with the 
FPM is as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )( )
( ) ( ){ } ( )( )
1
s
1
max 1 d
  1 d
D S Q
R
R
D S Q
Q p S r Q p c D S r Q cQ f r r
pD p h S r Q D cQ f r r
ϕ
ϕ
Π ϕ α ϕ
β ϕ
− −
− −
= + + + + − − − − − +ª º¬ ¼
+ − − + + − −ª º¬ ¼
³
³
 (6) 
Respectively solving the first-order condition and second-order derivative regarding Q of ( )QΠ , 
we found that the problem of Eq. (6) was a convex optimization problem, and we can obtain 
the optimal ordering quantity under the centralized decision satisfying the following condition: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )C s
11
1
h c p
F D S Q
h c p p
β
ϕ α β
+ − −ª º
− − =« » + − − −¬ ¼  (7) 
Clearly, under a centralized decision with the FPM, the optimal ordering quantity 
increases as the second transfer cost sc  increases, and decreases as the transfer cost c and rate 
of increase of the retail price of unit water resources α  increases. As the optimal ordering 
quantity is obtained, the optimal profit of the supply chain under the centralized decision is 
easy to determine.  
3.2.2 Coordination for decentralized decision model of SNWD supply chain 
We assume that the external distributor shares 1 φ−  of his revenue with the local 
supplier under a revenue-sharing contract, where 0 1φ≤ ≤ . Therefore, the optimal problem 
for the external distributor under the decentralized decision is as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )( )
( ) ( ){ } ( )( )
1
d s
1
max 1 d
  1 d
D S Q
R
R
D S Q
p S r Q p w D S r Q wQ f r r
pD p h S r Q D wQ f r r
ϕ
ϕ
Π φ ϕ φ α ϕ
φ φ β ϕ
− −
− −
= + + + + − − − − − +ª º¬ ¼
+ − − + + − −ª º¬ ¼
³
³
(8) 
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where sw  is the second-ordering wholesale price. Respectively solving the first-order 
condition and second-order derivative regarding Q of dΠ , we found that the problem of Eq. (8) 
was a convex optimization problem, and we can obtain the optimal ordering quantity under the 
decentralized decision satisfying the following condition: 
 ( ) ( )( )D s
11
1
h w p
F D S Q
h w p p
φ β
ϕ φα φ β
+ − −ª º
− − =« » + − − −¬ ¼  (9) 
Evidently, with the FPM, the optimal ordering quantity for the external distributor increases as 
the second-ordering wholesale price sw  increases, and decreases as the wholesale price w 
and rate of increase of the retail price of unit water resources α  increase.  
To achieve coordination under a revenue-sharing contract, the equation C DQ Q=  needs 
to be satisfied. Therefore, the water diversion supply chain coordination can be achieved via 
the following linear combination: 
 
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )( ) )
C
s
sC s
s s
1 1
1 1 1
1
1
,  0, 1 1
w c p
w c p p
h c p p
h c p
p c p
φ β ε
Δφ α φ β ε
Δ
Δ α β
Δ β
ε ε φ β
­ = − − − +°°
= − − − − − +ª º¬ ¼°°
= + − − −®°
= + − −°°∀ ∈ ∈ − + − −ª¬°¯ R
 (10) 
where sCw  is the coordinated second-ordering wholesale price. As mentioned above, 
condition (2) sc c pα− >  was applied in this study, and then we have sΔ Δ> . Therefore, the 
corresponding optimal profit of the external distributor and local supplier under a 
revenue-sharing contract can be obtained under these coordinated conditions. 
3.3 Case with SCB and FPM 
Based on the model analysis mentioned above, we introduced strategic customers to our 
model, considering the impact of SCB on the supply chain decision and performance. Strategic 
customers are customers who order water resources immediately at the retail price p with 
water resources utility Hu , or who delay ordering water resources at a higher price ( )1 pα+  
(water shortage condition) or a lower price ( )1 pβ−  (water oversupply condition) with utility 
Lu . Pr  is the reservation price or willingness to pay in the regular selling season, and satisfies 
the condition ( ) P L H1 p c p r u uβ− ≤ < < < < . 
After introducing strategic customers, the external distributor needs to determine both the 
water resources ordering quantity Q and the water resources retail price p. Strategic customers 
are able to know the value of p, but are not able to know the value of Q. The expected 
probability of water oversupply for strategic customers is aξ . After finding the retail price p, 
strategic customers need to choose the reservation price Pr . The external distributor is not able 
to know the value of Pr , but is able to determine an expected evaluation value rξ  of Pr . 
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We adopted the following decision sequence: First, strategic customers have water 
resources demand D, and the external distributor is able to understand the demand. Then, the 
external distributor determines an expected evaluation value rξ  of the reservation price, and 
chooses the optimal retail price p and ordering quantity Q. Then, strategic customers estimate 
the expected probability aξ  of water resources oversupply, and determine their reservation 
price Pr . Next, the random precipitation is considered the known precipitation. Then, the 
external distributor sells water resources at the retail price p. Finally, excess water resources 
are sold at the salvage price ( )1 pβ− , and shortage demand is satisfied by a second-ordering 
opportunity at a higher price ( )1 pα+ . 
We first analyzed the strategic customers’ decision problem. Strategic customers’ 
expected surplus is ( ) ( ) ( ){ }H L a L amax , 1 1 1u p u p u pα ξ β ξ− − + − + − −ª º ª º¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ , where the first 
term is the surplus from ordering water resources immediately at the retail price p, and the 
second term is the expected surplus from delaying ordering water resources. 
Obviously, the condition for strategic customers choosing to order water resources 
immediately at the retail price p is as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )H L a L a1 1 1u p u p u pα ξ β ξ− ≥ − + − + − −ª º ª º¬ ¼ ¬ ¼  (11) 
Therefore, given an expected probability aξ , the reservation price of unit water resources for 
strategic customers is as follows: 
 ( ) ( )
H L
P a
a
u ur ξ
α β ξ α
−
=
+ −
 (12) 
We assume that information about expected probability aξ  and reservation price Pr  is 
shared among homogeneous strategic customers, and also that strategic customers are 
risk-neutral. Obviously, given expected evaluation value rξ , the external distributor will 
choose rp ξ=  and ( ) ( )arg max ,Q p Q pΠ=  when he is making a pricing decision. 
According to the definition of rational expectations equilibrium (Su and Zhang 2008), we have 
a rational expectations equilibrium ( )P a r,  ,  ,  ,  p Q r ξ ξ  satisfying the following conditions: 
(1) ( ) ( )
H L
P a
a
u ur ξ
α β ξ α
−
=
+ −
; (2) rp ξ= ; (3) ( ) ( )arg max ,Q p Q pΠ= ;            
(4) ( )a 1F D S Qξ ϕ
ª º
= − −« »¬ ¼ ; and (5) Pr rξ = . Conditions (1), (2), and (3) indicate that the external 
distributor and strategic customers will rationally make utility maximization decisions. 
Condition (4) suggests that the probability F  of strategic customers obtaining excess water 
resources at the salvage price ( )1 pβ−  should be in accordance with expected probability aξ . 
Condition (5) shows that the external distributor’s expected reservation price rξ  should be 
consistent with the reservation price Pr . 
Obviously, rational expectations equilibrium conditions can be simplified as follows: 
( ) ( )
H L
1
u up
F D S Qβ α β
ϕ
−
= ª º
− + − −« »¬ ¼
, ( )arg max ,Q Q pΠ=             (13) 
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Then, we have  
 ( ) ( )( )
H L
B
1 p u uF D S Q
p
β
ϕ α β
− −ª º
− − =« » +¬ ¼  (14) 
where BQ  is the optimal ordering quantity with SCB. 
3.3.1 Centralized decision model of SNWD supply chain 
Obviously, the optimal ordering quantity of the centralized supply chain under a rational 
expectations equilibrium satisfies the equation B CQ Q= . Then, we have an optimal price and 
ordering quantity for the centralized decision of the SNWD supply chain with SCB and the 
FPM as follows: 
 ( )
C C
BC 2 2 1
p
Λ Δ
α β
±
=
−
 (15) 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
BC
BC
s BC BC
11
1
h c p
F D S Q
h c p p
β
ϕ α β
+ − −ª º
− − =« » + − − −¬ ¼  (16) 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )C H L s1 u u c c h cΛ α β β α= + − − + − − +  (17) 
 ( )( )( )2C s H L4 2 1 h c u uΔ Λ α β= − − + −  (18) 
where BCp  is the rational expectations equilibrium retail price under the centralized decision, 
and BCQ  is the rational expectations equilibrium ordering quantity under the centralized decision.  
Explicitly, under a centralized decision with the FPM and SCB, the optimal ordering 
quantity increases as the second transfer cost sc  increases, and decreases as the transfer cost c 
and rate of increase of the retail price of unit water resources α  increase. As the optimal retail 
price and ordering quantity are obtained, the optimal profit for the centralized supply chain is 
easily determined. 
3.3.2 Coordination for decentralized decision model of SNWD supply chain 
Obviously, the optimal ordering quantity of a decentralized supply chain under a rational 
expectations equilibrium satisfies the condition B DQ Q= . Then, we have an optimal pricing 
and ordering quantity for the decentralized decision of the SNWD supply chain with SCB and 
the FPM as follows: 
 ( )
D D
BD 2 2 1
p
Λ Δ
α β
±
=
−
 (19) 
 ( ) ( )( )
BD
BD
s BD BD
11
1
h w p
F D S Q
h w p p
φ β
ϕ φα φ β
+ − −ª º
− − =« » + − − −¬ ¼  (20) 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )D H L s1 u u w w h wΛ φ α β β α= + − − + − − +  (21) 
 ( )( )( )2D D s H L4 2 1 h w u uΔ Λ φα β= − − + −  (22) 
where BDp  is the rational expectations equilibrium retail price under the decentralized 
decision, and BDQ  is the rational expectations equilibrium ordering quantity under the 
decentralized decision.  
Clearly, with the FPM and SCB, the optimal ordering quantity for an external distributor 
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increases as the second-ordering wholesale price sw  increases, and decreases as the wholesale 
price w and rate of increase of the retail price of unit water resources α  increase. 
Under a revenue-sharing contract, to achieve coordination, it is necessary to make 
BC BDp p=  and BC BDQ Q= . Then, we have a kind of coordinated condition C DΛ Λ=  and 
C DΔ Δ= . Therefore, supply chain coordination can be achieved with the following conditions: 
 
( )( )
( )
( )( )( )s H L
C
1 1 1h c u u
w c
β φ φ α β
φ α β α β
− + − + − −
= + −
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=  (24) 
Under these coordinated conditions, the corresponding optimal profits of the external 
distributor and local supplier under a revenue-sharing contract can be obtained. 
4 Numerical analysis 
According to the SNWD overall plan and the corresponding reports, we set parameters as 
follows: The total water demand D is about 30 km3 and the original storage S is about 10 km3. 
We assume that precipitation R obeys normal distribution, its mean is 25μ = km3, and its 
standard deviation is 5σ = km3; that is, R ~ ( )225,5N . 0R = , 50R = km3, and the usage 
rate of precipitation for the external distributor is about 0.4. The dimensionless parameters are 
0.15α = , 0.8β = , 0.4ϕ = , and 0.75φ = . According to some estimated data from the 
overall plan and corresponding reports, the average unit cost c of water transfer is about 0.25 
to 0.35 yuan/m3. Therefore, we set 30.3 yuan/mc =  and 3s 0.7 yuan/mc = . The retail price p 
is about 2 to 3 yuan/m3, thus we set 32 yuan/mp = . Usually, the holding cost h is small and a 
shortage cost b is relatively large for water resources, thus we set 30.2 yuan/mh = , and 
30.4 yuan/mb = . According to the corresponding economic data, a unit of water is able to 
produce a GDP of 3 to 5 yuan/m3. Therefore, we set 3H 5 yuan/mμ = , and 3L 4 yuan/mμ = . 
We carried out numerical analysis for three cases with Matlab R2010b. The numerical analysis 
results are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 Numerical analysis results 
Case Condition CQ  
(109 m3) 
BCp  
(yuan/m3) 
Cw  
(yuan/m3)
sCw  
(yuan/m3) 
scΠ  
(109 yuan) 
cdΠ  
(109 yuan) 
csΠ  
(109 yuan) 
1  11.739 — 0.200 — 55.578 41.813 13.765 
2  10.000 — 0.200 0.530 56.840 42.985 13.855 
3 
a 10.544 2.340 0.460 1.000 67.226 47.811 19.415 
b  9.517 4.270 0.460 1.000 125.506 91.649 33.857 
Note: Case 1 is the case without SCB and FPM. Case 2 is the case without SCB and with FPM. Case 3 is the case with SCB and 
FPM. Condition a is BC L Hp u u< < , and condition b is L BC Hu p u< < . scΠ  is the optimal profit of the supply chain, cdΠ  
is the coordinated profit of the external distributor, and csΠ  is the coordinated profit of the local supplier. 
Comparing all three cases, we can make the following conclusions: 
(1) Comparing case 1 with case 2, when the supply chain achieves coordination, owing to 
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the water shortage supplements and excess water promotion policy provided by the FPM, the 
optimal water resources ordering quantity with the FPM is less than that without the FPM, the 
initial wholesale price with the FPM is almost the same as that without the FPM, and the 
second-ordering wholesale price is higher than the initial wholesale price. The optimal profits 
of the whole supply chain, local supplier, and external distributor with the FPM are higher 
than they would be without the FPM. 
(2) Comparing case 2 with case 3, when the supply chain achieves coordination, the 
initial wholesale price and second-ordering wholesale price with SCB are higher than those 
without SCB. The optimal profits of the whole supply chain, local supplier, and external 
distributor with SCB are higher than they would be without SCB.  
(3) For case 3, condition a means that strategic customers’ delaying ordering utility is 
higher than the retail price, i.e., strategic customers’ net profit is positive at the salvage sale 
phase; and condition b means that strategic customers’ delaying ordering utility is lower than 
the retail price, i.e., strategic customers’ net profit is negative at the salvage sale phase. 
Comparing the two conditions in case 3, obviously, the optimal water resources ordering 
quantity under condition a is more than that under condition b, the retail price under condition 
a is lower than that under condition b, and the initial wholesale price and second-ordering 
wholesale price under condition a are the same as those under condition b. The optimal profits 
of the whole supply chain, local supplier, and external distributor under condition a are lower 
than those under condition b.  
(4) Comparing all three cases, considering SCB and introducing the FPM help increase 
the profits of the whole supply chain, the local supplier, and the external distributor, and 
improve water use efficiency. 
5 Conclusions  
This study defined the supply chain system for the SNWD Project considering the actual 
project conditions, built a decentralized decision model and a centralized decision model with 
SCB and with the FPM, and constructed a coordination mechanism with a revenue-sharing 
contract. The results suggest the following: (1) Owing to the water shortage supplements and 
excess water sale policy provided by the FPM, the optimal ordering quantity of water 
resources is less than that without the FPM, and the optimal profits of the whole supply chain, 
local supplier, and external distributor are higher than they would be without the FPM. (2) The 
initial wholesale price and second-ordering wholesale price with SCB are higher than those 
without SCB, and the optimal profits of the whole supply chain, local supplier, and external 
distributor are higher than they would be without SCB. (3) There are two kinds of solutions for 
a centralized optimal model and a decentralized optimal model with SCB and the FPM. 
Comparing two kinds of solutions, we find that setting the retail price of unit water resources 
between the lowest and highest utilities of the strategic consumer helps all participants achieve 
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greater profit. (4) Considering SCB and introducing the FPM help increase the optimal profits 
of the whole supply chain, supplier, and external distributor, and improve the efficiency of 
water resources usage. 
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